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Religion and union formation in Italy: 
Catholic precepts, social pressure, and tradition 
Daniele Vignoli
1
 
Silvana Salvini
2
 
Abstract 
BACKGROUND 
Italy is customarily viewed as a traditional Catholic country. At the same time, couples 
are increasingly living together without marrying. Establishing links between religion 
and family formation is a complex issue and little is known about specific mechanisms 
through which religion shapes family change in the country. 
 
OBJECTIVE 
We aim to shed light on which aspects of religion are important in decisions about 
family formation. 
 
METHODS 
We analyze data from eight focus group interviews conducted in Florence. In the 
transcripts we identify any references to religion and systematically compare categories 
to investigate how religiosity intertwines with relationship choices. We apply bottom-
up coding procedures to identify meaning and concepts within three theoretically 
relevant areas: Catholic precepts, social pressure, and tradition. 
 
RESULTS 
Despite the predominance of religion in the studied setting, Italians behave without 
according much importance to Catholic precepts and dogmas. Religion seems to 
influence people‟s family behaviors through social pressures to marry generated by the 
family of origin and the judgment of „others‟. Tradition also plays an important role. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The widely prevailing pressure of parents and peers and the hedonistic aspects of the 
traditional Church wedding seem to be more important in partnership formation than 
Catholic prescripts. Thus, we posit that the direct effect of religion on individual 
choices is overestimated when interpreting the Italian family. In addition, we note the 
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divergence that exists between the lack of state laws concerning consensual unions and 
the acceptance of cohabitation on an individual basis. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The literature supporting the idea of the “Second Demographic Transition” advocates 
that changes in family behaviors in the Western World have been strongly linked to 
secularization
3
 – a process characterized by the withdrawal from traditional religious 
beliefs and a decline in subjective religiosity among individuals (Lesthaeghe and 
Surkyn 1988; Van de Kaa 1987; Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2006). In this context Italy 
represents an interesting case study. Attachment to Catholic values and the strong 
position of the Roman Catholic Church constitute key elements that characterize Italian 
society. Pre-marital sex, cohabitation, and divorce are forbidden by the Church, 
whereas a high value is placed on marriage and family life. In addition, the presence of 
the Vatican City within the national borders makes Italy a unique setting for studying 
the links between religion and family choices. Italian demographers and sociologists 
have often linked the strong attachment to Catholic values to the delayed diffusion in 
Italy of new family behaviors such as cohabitation, marital dissolution, or non-marital 
childbearing (De Sandre et al. 1997; Barbagli and Saraceno 1997; Angeli, Pillati, and 
Rettaroli 1999; Castiglioni 1999; Barbagli 2000; Barbagli, Castiglioni and Dalla 
Zuanna 2003; De Rose, Racioppi, and Zanatta 2008; Zanatta 2008; De Rose and 
Vignoli 2011). 
Despite its orientation towards placing a high value on traditional marriage, 
however, contemporary Italy is faced with a rising breakdown of marriages and a 
growing flexibility of union patterns. In less than 20 years, between 1993 and 2011, the 
number of cohabiting unions increased from 227,000 to 972,000, and, among them, the 
number of unmarried partners increased from 67,000 to 578,000 (Istat 2011). In 
addition, the diffusion of cohabitation is no longer confined solely to certain social 
groups or to certain geographical areas (Gabrielli and Hoem 2010; Gabrielli and 
Vignoli 2013). Interestingly, the diffusion of cohabitation is developing hand in hand 
with a slow but continuous process of secularization (Sansonetti 2009). This trend 
towards greater secularization is suggested by the generalized decrease in participation 
in public religious practice and in particular in rites of passage (e.g., baptism, 
                                                          
3 Secularization is a multidimensional and complex social process. In this paper we refer to secularization as 
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and Altınordu 2008; for a review of the concept with specific reference to Mediterranean Europe see Kosmin 
and Keysar 2009). 
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communion, Church wedding), as well as by a decrease in religious vocations 
(Sansonetti 2009).  
Overall, macro and micro empirical research illustrate a correlation between 
family-related behaviors and religiosity (e.g., Tanfer 1987; Adsera 2006; Frejka and 
Westoff 2008; Philipov and Berghammer 2007; Berghammer 2009; Berghammer 
2012). Studies that tested the relationship between religiosity and family patterns found 
a strong and positive association between religious affiliation and commitment, and 
conventional sexual values and behavior (e.g., in the U.S.: Thornton and Camburn 
1987; Sweet and Bumpass 1990; Thornton, Axinn, and Hill 1992; in the Netherlands: 
Liefbroer and Gierveld 1993). For Italy, Löffler (2009) revealed that women with little 
or no Roman Catholic Church affiliation enter cohabitation more often than do other 
women. Religious people, especially those who are religiously active, are less likely to 
cohabit than secular people (Löffler 2009). While these quantitative studies demonstrate 
a relationship between religion and family behaviors, they have limited power in 
informing us of how people think about the relationship between religion and union 
formation, specifically the extent to which individuals see religion influencing their 
choices. A recent study explicitly addressed the role of people‟s perceptions of religious 
influence on their family decisions (Sigalow, Shain, and Bergey 2012). The authors 
urged future research to investigate the role that religion plays in family life in order to 
understand “if and how people use religion as a guide in their lives and in what contexts 
people draw upon religion” (Sigalow, Shain, and Bergey 2012: 321). 
This paper addresses the role of religion on union formation through qualitative 
research. By drawing upon data from eight Focus Group (FG) interviews conducted in 
Florence we aim to shed light on which aspects of the overall influence of religion on 
family formation choices are the most important. Florence is a typical secular city of the 
Central-Northern Italian region, governed since the 1980s by liberal left-wing parties 
that are relatively supportive of non-traditional living arrangements. Thus, this setting is 
important for showing the role of religion in union formation when a society is 
undergoing secularization and a redefinition of being religious among its citizens. The 
FG transcripts were systematically scrutinized in order to explore three key potential 
mechanisms through which religion may act: (1) the role of Catholic precepts, (2) the 
role of social pressure, and (3) the role of tradition. We move beyond past research by 
parsing out how people perceive religion in connection with their family choices. In 
addition, we contribute to the overall understanding of the role of religion in the 
everyday life of Italians. 
This study also has an important ancillary objective. Given the recent increase in 
the number of people choosing to live together without marrying in Italy – especially as 
a prelude to marriage – we intend to provide qualitative evidence of the paradox that 
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exists between the lack of state laws towards consensual unions (in terms of partners‟ 
rights and obligations) and the practice of cohabitation on an individual basis. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the role of religion 
in driving the adoption of new family patterns, proposing three major channels through 
which religion may act. Section 3 presents the context of and main trends in family 
formation practices in Italy. Data, method, and results follow (Section 4 and 5). The last 
Section 6 concludes the paper with a summary and discussion of the main findings. 
 
 
2. Religion and union formation choices: three potential contexts of 
interaction 
A large literature has established a connection between religion and family behavior 
(e.g., Thornton, Axinn, and Hill 1992; Lehrer 2000; Teachman 2002; McQuillan 2004; 
Adsera 2006; Frejka and Westoff 2008; Berghammer 2009, 2012). Various dimensions 
of religiosity, including attendance, commitment, and the centrality of religion in 
people‟s lives, have been shown to be associated with many dimensions of family life 
such as marriage, divorce, and family size. While quantitative studies have provided 
important insights into the link between secularization and family formation practices 
on the population level, they have been unable to shed light on specific mechanisms 
through which religiosity and secularization intertwine with relationship choices. In this 
section we discuss three potential contexts of interaction between religion and union 
formation: (1) Catholic precepts, (2) social pressure, and (3) tradition. 
First, marriage and sexual relations are interwoven in the moral teachings and 
precepts of most religions (Thornton, Axinn, and Hill 1992). Historically, strong ties 
exist between religion and conventional family lifestyles (Oropesa 1996). Since the 
Late Middle Ages the Catholic Church has held the Christian sacrament of marriage to 
be the sole base of intimate relationships and human reproduction. According to the 
Catholic doctrine, sexual intercourse is only appropriate in the context of marriage, 
because only in marriage can sexuality express the two fundamental dimensions of 
conjugal life: the harmony and fertility of the couple. In Catholic morality premarital 
sexual relations are not only disapproved of: they are simply excluded. Hence, Catholic 
people should opt for marriage rather than cohabitation. Those who wish to marry have 
to agree on the times and the dynamics of their marriage preparation, grow in intimacy, 
and preserve the most complete expression of their love for the future conjugal life. 
Catholic principles thus dictate a sharp transition from the family of origin to the family 
of procreation, which leaves little (or no) space for cohabitation. Importantly, religions 
that rely on a hierarchically organized church and which are dominant throughout a 
country (as is the case for the Roman Catholic Church in Italy) should face weaker 
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discrepancies between official dogmas and the local teachings and practices of Church 
officials (Ellingson et al. 2001). 
Second, individuals may experience social pressure to marry. Religiosity may not 
only impact individual-level behavior by promoting specific norms or rules, it may also 
promote broader values or principles that impact family formation indirectly 
(McQuillan 2004; Goldscheider 2006). Those who marry exhibit socially accepted 
behavior and receive approval from society, family, and individuals in their social 
surroundings (Kalmijn 2004). This could be of particular importance in countries where 
cohabitation is less accepted, such as Southern Europe (and Italy). According to Reher 
(1998), Mediterranean countries are characterized by strong family ties, with 
Catholicism contributing to the continuation of traditional family structures. Dalla 
Zuanna (2001) described the relationship between Roman Catholic belief and prevailing 
family patterns: he suggested that Catholicism has reinforced familism, and vice versa 
(see also Dalla Zuanna and Micheli 2004). Thus, parents may be especially important in 
influencing the choice of whether to cohabit or marry. Young people follow their 
parents‟ religious denomination and frequently follow their parents‟ levels of religious 
commitment and participation (Löffler 2009). In addition, parents can influence the 
perceptions and behaviors of their children through their guidance and supervision. For 
instance, Rosina and Fraboni (2004) suggest that in Italy young adults weigh the 
decision to adopt a new living arrangement with the level of acceptance of their family 
of origin. Parents view the failure of their children as their own failure and they may try 
to discourage their offspring from doing things that are socially uncommon or not 
accepted (Di Giulio and Rosina 2007), such as behaving counter to the prevailing 
Catholic doctrine. 
Besides the judgment of the family of origin, the neighborhood may also influence 
the choice to cohabit or to marry. Those living in religious surroundings are likely to be 
embedded in very specific types of social networks that maintain behavior that is 
consistent with the prescription of the dominant religion (Smith 2003). Neighborhood-
level religiosity may interact with individual religiosity or moderate its effect. The lack 
of social acceptance for non-marital cohabitation imposed in certain surroundings may 
restrict individual decisions regarding family formation, even of non-religious people 
(Baranowska-Rataj, Mynarska, and Vignoli 2013). Altogether, the choice to cohabit is 
linked with heavier psychological costs than the choice to marry, especially for 
religious people, because of a generalized social disapproval of cohabitation stemming 
from both the family of origin and the network of people individuals are confronted 
with. 
Third, an important context in which religion interacts with family formation lies 
in the power of tradition. The term tradition usually refers to the transmission over time 
of memories, social or historical events, customs, rituals, and religious beliefs within a 
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group or society (e.g., family traditions). Giddens (1994) sees tradition as something 
bound to ritual, where ritual guarantees the continuation of tradition. Although the 
concept of tradition is clearly intertwined with familial and social pressure towards 
marriage, it allows us to explore the link between religion and union choices from a 
different angle. The Catholic Church maintains a strong influence in many societies, 
especially in Southern Europe, also in light of the prevailing tradition. Adult children 
must rely on prevailing customs and habits when making their own choices. From this 
perspective, many Catholics preserve religion merely as a form of social identity and 
tradition, going to church only for rites of passage (Pierucci and Prandi 2000). Marrying 
in Church is perhaps the most important of such rites (Dittgen 1995). 
 
 
3. Religion and the setting for family choices in Italy 
The Italian setting offers an intriguing forum for the exploration of the specific 
mechanisms that link religion and family formation dynamics. As in other Southern 
European societies, Italians are “shaped by the Church and hence strongly committed to 
the preservation of traditional familyhood” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 27). In Italy, the 
Catholic Church directly controls a national radio station (Vatican Radio, which is 
translated into 41 other languages), a satellite television channel (Sat 2000, owned by 
the Italian Episcopal Conference) and two national newspapers (L’Osservatore 
Romano, the official Vatican newspaper, also available in seven other languages, and 
L’Avvenire, the official newspaper of the Italian Episcopal Conference). Catholic 
organizations control other national mass media such as a national radio station (Radio 
Maria, which is quite diffused although mainly listened to by the elderly), magazines, 
and periodicals at national or local levels (among which it is worth mentioning 
Famiglia Cristiana, which is very widespread and represents an important channel of 
diffusion of family ideals). In addition, a large number of Catholic television and radio 
programs are broadcast weekly by all the channels of Italian state television and radio 
(Rai) (Sansonetti 2009). Today, the state provides public schools with church-appointed 
teachers of Catholic religion and pays the teachers‟ salaries (students or parents have to 
declare at the beginning of the school year whether they want to attend religion courses 
or not). In short, in Italy, as in many other countries, the „institutional‟ presence of the 
Church in the everyday life of its citizens is not negligible. However, Catholicism is not 
monolithic, as many different attitudes towards the hierarchy, volunteering, the Holy 
Father, and several ethical issues coexist in the country (Garelli 2011; Bonarini 2013). 
According to data from the International Social Survey Programme (2008), over 
90% of citizens in Italy are raised in the Catholic religion (compared with an average of 
49% in other EU member states). In addition, 30% of Italians believe that religious 
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leaders should try to influence the decisions of the government (Kosmin 2009). In order 
to contextualize what distinguishes Italy from other countries in the “domain” of 
religion, we refer to a recent study that proposed a method to evaluate the relative 
“distance” between countries based on individual data (De Santis, Maltagliati, and 
Salvini 2014). The authors applied the method
4
 to the World Value Survey (WVS) 
dataset for the years 1994–2007 on several “domains”, including religion. In the WVS 
data there were seven elementary variables associated with the latent variable “religion” 
(for a list of the questions used, see De Santis, Maltagliati, and Salvini 2014). They then 
provide a rough approximation to measure how high or low each respondent scored on 
the latent dimension of religion, which was obtained by (arbitrarily) associating each 
answer with a numerical value
5
. The summary results suggest that, in the European 
context, Romania, Poland, and Italy (in that order) proved to be more religiously 
oriented than other countries. 
The position of the Church has historically permeated the context of family 
choices in Italy. From the postwar period until the breakdown of the old political 
regime in 1992, Italy was led for almost half a century by governments of Catholic 
background
6
. Catholicism maintained a strong influence on the public and private lives 
of Italians, especially in areas where the Catholic party Democrazia Cristiana had more 
than 50% of votes during the three decades following World War II: in some provinces 
of the North-East and in most provinces of the South (Dalla Zuanna, De Rose, and 
Racioppi 2005). During the leadership of these governments, however, Italy 
experienced a series of important changes in a very short time-span, mainly due to the 
political awakening of the young in the 1960s and the strength of the feminist 
movement in the 1970s (Livi Bacci 2001; De Rose, Racioppi, and Zanatta 2008). 
Divorce was introduced in 1970 (Law n. 898), although divorce can only occur after the 
couple is legally separated for a long period (initially five years; three years since 
1987). In 1975, key improvements in Italian family law assigned the same rights to 
children born outside marriage as to those born within marriage, especially regarding 
the right of alimony. Previously, children born out of wedlock had suffered legal 
discrimination. Abortion was legalized in 1978. Both divorce and abortion laws were 
subsequently confirmed by referenda: 59% of Italians voted for divorce in 1974 and 
67% for abortion in 1981
7
. 
                                                          
4 First, clusters of respondents are formed and the proportion of each country‟s respondents that belongs to the 
various clusters is calculated. Second, the distance between countries is expressed in terms of distance 
between the observed distributions (the average of the squared differences between the ranks). 
5 The attributed scores did not influence the results, however (De Santis, Maltagliati, Salvini 2014). 
6 For a review of the role played by the Church in the historical development of Italy see Ercolessi (2009). 
7 Italy was not alone in this process as the 1970s was a decade of change for many Western societies (e.g., in 
the US abortion was legalized in 1973, and in France and Germany in 1975).  
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With the exception of a few minor regional laws, there are no legal regulations 
devoted to unmarried couples. Legal judgments are essentially made case-by-case on 
the basis of the partners‟ situation (Zanatta 2008). Cohabiting individuals have less 
protection in the case of a separation or partner‟s death because they do not have access 
to alimony or to the partner‟s old age pension. In addition, these legal judgments are 
complex, especially when unmarried partners split up after neglecting to specify who 
paid which amounts of money for what purpose. In 2007 a moderate government bill on 
the legal recognition of the rights and obligations of cohabiting (including same-sex) 
couples was abandoned, due to controversies inside the “center-left” parliamentary 
majority (De Rose and Marquette 2011). 
Previous studies have advocated a strong link between religion and family-related 
behaviors in Italy (Castiglioni 1999). Individuals who openly declare being in favor of 
cohabitation are generally those who are atheist or agnostic or, despite claiming to be 
religious, admit that they do not practice Catholic rites (Angeli, Pillati, and Rettaroli 
1999). However, the link between Catholic precepts and individual behaviors is far 
more complex than simple predictions would suggest (Barbagli and Saraceno 1997). 
Surveys conducted in the middle class in the 1970s showed that attitudes were 
becoming more flexible when applying Catholic precepts (e.g., in terms of pre-nuptial 
sexual behavior and contraception), as well as a growing detachment towards these 
precepts (De Sandre et al. 1997). In addition, during the early 1970s the incidence of 
non-religious marriages (among all marriages) increased from 2% to 10%: nowadays 
almost 40% of marriages are celebrated with a civil ceremony. A civil marriage clearly 
represents a secularized choice, displayed to the outside world (Impicciatore and Billari 
2012). In parallel, another tangible sign of secularization is represented by the decline 
in public religious practices. Participation in life-cycle rites decreased in Italy during 
1991–2004. Of the total children born alive in a year, the percentage of children under 
age one who were baptized fell from 89.9% in 1991 to 77.5% in 2004 (Sansonetti 
2009). This decline may be related not only to the increasing presence of foreign people 
but also to a new attitude of Italian parents towards baptism (Bonarini 2013).  
Up to the second half of the 1970s, family patterns in Italy were characterized by 
very rigid life courses, with marriage at the center; then traces of change began to 
emerge. Marriage rates declined slightly, while cohabitation and marital dissolution 
spread throughout the population. These changes intensified in the 1990s and spiked in 
the first decade of the twenty-first century, when the pace of change rose dramatically 
(Vignoli, Gabrielli, and Gualtieri 2011). Marriage is now increasingly postponed (in the 
period 2000–2008 the mean age at first marriage rose from 28 to 30 years for women 
and from 31 to 33 years for men). This phenomenon explains most of the reduction in 
crude marriage rates, from 6 per thousand in 1990 to 5 per thousand in 2000 and up to 4 
per thousand in 2008. In the period 2006–2009, 38% of couples opted for cohabitation 
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as their first type of union (own computations on 2009 Family and Social Subjects 
survey). The diffusion of cohabitation has contributed to the rise of non-marital births: 
in 2010 non-marital births were over 134,000, nearly a quarter of total births. The 
increase was rapid: from 2% in 1970 to 10% in 2000, to 19% in 2008, to 20% in 2009, 
and up to 24% in 2010. The general downward trend in marriage and upward trend in 
cohabitation is a widespread phenomenon in Italy, but regional differentials persist. 
People marry more in the South (4.9 per thousand inhabitants in 2008) than in the North 
(3.6 per thousand inhabitants) and Central Italy (4 per thousand inhabitants). Also the 
recent increase in consensual unions appears mainly in Northern and Central Italy and 
not in the South, where non-marital unions remain quite rare (Gabrielli and Hoem 
2010). 
 
 
4. Data and method 
We conducted FG interviews in February to April 2012 in Florence. A focus group is a 
small group of individuals, generally comprising 6–8 people, that discusses topics 
organized around a major theme, with the discussion guided by a moderator. The data 
for this research have been collected following the research design developed by the 
international research project, Focus on Partnerships. Team members collaborated to 
create a standardized focus group guideline, which was used to direct the focus group 
discussions. (For further information on this project see Perelli-Harris et al. (2014) or 
www.nonmarital.org.) The interview guidelines included numerous questions regarding 
cohabitation and marriage, such as the (dis)advantages of living together without 
marriage, motivations for marriage, and barriers to marriage. Marriage and cohabitation 
were also explored in relation to institutions, policies, and laws. Importantly for this 
paper, the role of religion was investigated using an explicit probing question.  
Recruitment of the participants and organization of the focus group interviews 
were supported by the research agency, University of Florence Academic Spin-Off 
Valmon s.r.l., and the discussions took place at its premises. The research agency 
recruited via the distribution of brochures and advertisements in cinemas, universities, 
sport clubs, shopping malls, etc. The participants received an incentive of 20 euros per 
person. Participants were 25–40 years of age and were divided into groups by gender 
and educational attainment. In accordance with the project guidelines, focus groups 
were not stratified by partnership and parenthood status, because partnership histories 
can be inherently complicated, and it was unclear how to categorize those who 
experienced premarital cohabitation, separation or divorce, remarriage, etc. Hence, 
because our main goal was to gain deeper insight into the nature of cohabitation and 
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marriage across different countries and not to explain individual biographies, we did not 
stratify by partnership and parenthood status. 
The higher level of education included women and men with a bachelor‟s or a 
master‟s degree as well as those with a post-tertiary qualification. The lower level of 
education included primary, vocational, lower-secondary, and upper-secondary 
educational attainment. In total, eight FG interviews were conducted: two with women 
of low-medium education, two with women with some tertiary education, two with men 
of low-medium education, and two with men with tertiary degree. Those who worked in 
any kind of social research were excluded from the sampling strategy. Altogether 58 
informants participated in the study. The overall composition of the sample is reported 
in Table 1. 
Our analysis aimed to explore how people talked about cohabitation and marriage 
in relation to religion. Special attention was paid to any references to religiosity and 
secularization with respect to the pros and cons of cohabitation and marriage. Within 
this material we applied bottom-up coding within the three main contexts identified as 
theoretically important: (1) the role of Catholic precepts, (2) the role of social pressure, 
and (3) the role of tradition. We finally reached a set of categories within each of these 
three major themes. In addition, a systematic bottom-up exploration of FG interviews 
was made with the aim of studying the link between the lack of state laws towards 
consensual unions (in terms of partners‟ rights and obligations) and individual choices. 
Despite our sample not being representative of the population of young women and 
men in Florence, we are confident that our results offer a good representation of the 
range of meanings and attitudes attached to cohabitation and marriage in relation to 
religion. 
 
Table 1: Structure of the sample by gender and education 
Country sample FG1 FG2 FG3 FG4 FG5 FG6 FG7 FG8 
Men    7 8  8  5 
Women 9 8   6  7  
High Education 9 8 7 8     
Low Education     6 8 7 5 
N. of participants 9 8 7 8 6 8 7 5 
 
The main advantage of focus group methodology over individual in-depth 
interviews is that this method provides the opportunity to study people in a more natural 
conversation situation. For instance, a spontaneous debate among participants on the 
link between union formation choices and the legal framework led to inferences on 
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some issues that were not included within the original guidelines (see Section 6). 
During the FG interviews there were some differences by gender and education in the 
way people reacted to the questions and in the overall atmosphere of the different 
meetings. First, the low-educated group, irrespective of gender, had difficulties in 
expressing concepts and making general statements. Men with lower education were the 
least talkative. By contrast, men and women with higher education talked more and 
made longer statements. Second, more disagreements and arguments occurred in higher 
educated groups. When a statement was made in the lower educated group it was harder 
for the other participants to argue against it. Finally, women, and especially those of 
low education, were more likely to make specific references to their own experiences 
(e.g., talking about their own life, or telling stories of friends and family) than men did. 
Women were also more likely to go off at a tangent. 
 
 
5. Results: Religion and union formation choices in Italy 
5.1 References to religion 
A systematic analysis of FG interviews revealed that concepts and meanings linked to 
religion, religiosity, and secularization issues did not only appear at several points in the 
narrations but permeated the whole discussion. The interviewees made a clear link 
between a person‟s religiosity and a higher propensity to marry. In addition, the 
participants recognized Italy as a Catholic and religious setting, and they referred to the 
Catholic culture and tradition when they discussed cohabitation and marriage. 
Informants unanimously acknowledged that the Catholic religion is among the main 
reasons why cohabitation does not spread as quickly in Italy as elsewhere. 
However, specific reference to Catholic precepts, dogmas, or sanctions was absent 
from all FG interviews. Although the influence of the Catholic Church permeates the 
setting of family choices in Italy, no one referred to the fact that cohabitation – a 
practice that openly acknowledges sexual relationships outside marriage – is forbidden 
by the Church. Thus, our findings speak to the possibility that the perception of 
religion‟s importance in individual choices does not act through an explicit attachment 
to precepts and dogmas. 
Specific reference to the role of religion appeared in two clusters of participants: 
those who strongly supported Catholicism and those who were in open opposition to it. 
The former group, mainly formed of highly educated women, advocated that people 
decide to get married because – despite the increasing number of cohabitations 
perceived around them – they still believe in marriage as a foundation of society. As 
one informant stated, “I‟m a religious person, so I believe in marriage, not in 
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cohabitation” (FG2, woman, highly educated). They argued that a church wedding has a 
specific symbolic meaning: spouses declare their intention to get married before God, 
not only in the presence of a person responsible for administrative tasks. Among this 
group of participants the deeper meaning of the Christian message, only partly mediated 
by Catholicism, emerged. A man and a woman who decide to get married in a Catholic 
rite freely choose to consolidate their union before God, because they believe that 
God‟s grace will make their marriage fruitful and happy. One female informant put this 
clearly, “I married 10 years ago, when I was young … I decided to get married in 
church because I am a practicing Catholic… the marriage has a value beyond a civil 
union.” (FG2, woman, highly educated). Interestingly, the overall process of 
secularization seems to have made this group of „deep believers‟ increasingly selective. 
Within this group some participants revealed that they are happy that cohabitation is 
now spreading rapidly in Italy, because in the future only those individuals who are  
genuinely religious will opt for marriage, in a conscious way. Importantly, even among 
this cluster of practicing Catholics, there were no specific references to Catholic 
precepts and dogmas. 
At the other extreme, a connection between cohabitation and secularization was 
recurrently mentioned by a cluster of highly educated people (again, formed of 
individuals present across different FG interviews) who were extremely opposed to 
conventional social norms and the Church. The presence of a group of „ideological 
cohabitors‟ has also been emphasized in other qualitative studies about cohabitation in 
Italy (Belletti, Boffi, and Pennati 2007; Grilli 2010). For this group, cohabiting means 
acting against the dominant morality in a public rejection of the institution of marriage. 
For instance, the following participants put this concept very clearly: “[cohabitation] is 
a personal, even ideological, cultural choice, because I don‟t like [the idea] of getting 
married” (FG2, woman, highly educated); “I reject the „marriage system‟, and I do not 
want to help preserve it forever” (FG3, man, highly educated). For these higher 
educated participants, cohabitation means a strong form of commitment in itself that is 
perceived as at least as important as a traditional (religious) marriage. A highly 
educated woman stated that “…cohabitation is already per se a commitment. When my 
partner and I decided to start living together, for us it was like deciding to get married: 
it was exactly the same thing” (FG1, woman, highly educated). For this cluster of 
highly educated people, cohabitors work harder at the quality of the relationship, for 
example: “the advantage of cohabitation is this: you wake up in the morning and if you 
want to leave, you can leave, and so… you have to choose to stay” (FG4, man, highly 
educated). 
In sum, some participants strongly supported Catholicism, others openly opposed 
it, the majority fell in between, and family life was discussed in the light of Catholic 
religion and in relation to it. However, the absence of specific reference to the teaching 
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of the Catholic doctrine, or to the fact that cohabitation means “living in sin”, suggests 
exploring the role of religion in people‟s family lives along other dimensions. 
 
 
5.2 Social pressure 
Our results highlight the presence of a marked social pressure to get married. Such 
pressure acts through two channels: the judgment of the family of origin and the 
opinions of “the others”. The role of the family of origin is considered to be especially 
important, e.g., “…a religious person, who grew up in a family with religious values, 
may be more inclined to marry. And the family could push for a Church wedding” 
(FG5: W, high education). The parents tend to believe that their child is “really settled 
down” only if he/she is married, as one informant explicitly put it, 
 
…if you are from a certain Catholic family, your parents might accept that 
you cohabit, but sooner or later you have to get married… you have to settle 
down. (FG4, man, highly educated) 
 
The pressure is not explicit or strong, but some participants experienced such 
pressure during their early life course. The role of the family of origin in pushing for 
marriage is seen as a general latent factor, as the following female participant 
suggested: “I think that many couples marry because you have to get married […] 
because it is something natural, something expected by the family” (FG1, woman, 
highly educated). Even if some informants say explicitly that their family did not exert 
any pressure on them, they acknowledge that in general this pressure exists. Children of 
religious parents may not want to embarrass them, create interpersonal conflicts, or 
incur negative parental sanctions. Marriage is something “expected” in the life of 
Catholic believers: 
 
In principle, I think marriage originates from religion ... When you are a kid 
you grow up with the continuous presence of religion in the family, and later 
when you are an adult it is natural to get married: marrying becomes 
something expected because of the culture ... because of religion. (FG6, man, 
low educated) 
 
The pressure to get married not only originates from the family of origin, but also 
from the social network in which people live. The participants repeatedly discussed the 
role of “the others” in an individual choice between cohabitation and marriage. Again, 
the pressure does not have a concrete form, but is important because “[M]arriage is 
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something that you celebrate in front of the others” (FG5, woman, low educated). We 
learn that a cohabiting couple is not recognized “by the others” in the same way as a 
married couple is. According to one informant, 
 
Despite everything, today two people who are married are considered as 
‘husband and wife’; two people cohabiting, although they live together for a 
long time, although they have a child, and as modern as we are, they are not 
100% a couple to the others. (FG8, man, low educated) 
 
Another informant said “when you cohabit you do not have the same role in 
society as you would if married” (FG7, woman, low educated). This perspective, 
brought to the extreme, transforms marriage into a sort of status symbol, where being a 
wife and a husband, likely a mother and a father, represents something that gives 
partners a higher social status – e.g., “…once married, you‟re a „husband and wife‟, 
then perhaps also a „mother‟; when you cohabit you do not have the same role in 
society…” (FG5, woman, low educated). In another discussion, one informant 
explicitly said that marriage is strongly encouraged by society. 
 
Many people get married just because society is asking them to do it; 
otherwise their relationship would not be well perceived by the others. (FG4, 
man, high educated) 
 
In sum, religious individuals perceive marriage as a socially accepted behavior, 
which is approved by society, the family, and “relevant others” in their social 
surroundings. Consistent with the familistic interpretation of Italian family formation 
practices (Dalla Zuanna 2001; Rosina and Fraboni 2004; Di Giulio and Rosina 2007), 
the pressure to marry originated by the family of origin is seen as more relevant than the 
voices of “the others”. One female respondent put this quite clearly: “In the decision to 
marry instead of cohabit, the family is much more important than friends” (FG2, 
woman, highly educated). 
The social pressure to marry generated by the family of origin and the pressure 
from “the others” together creates the condition for a general social disapproval of 
cohabitation. Nonetheless, within this context the secularization process is at play. 
Coherent with the arguments presented so far, and despite the dominant principles of 
the Roman Catholic Church, the diffusion of cohabitation seems to be occurring exactly 
because cohabitation is increasingly accepted by friends and, especially, by parents. The 
following argument was brought up in all FG interviews, 
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I think that today it is easier to start to cohabit simply because cohabitation is 
more socially accepted. (FG1, woman, highly educated) 
 
 
5.3 Tradition 
The Church wedding represents an important form of ritual, a crucial „rite of passage‟ 
in the life of many Italians. It embodies the concept of tradition and symbolizes an 
acknowledgment of customs and habits. Our findings suggest that people are 
increasingly confronted with a choice between cohabiting and a Church wedding. 
Marrying in Church guarantees the continuation of tradition and is often associated with 
the “most beautiful day” in one‟s life. This kind of argument was mostly mentioned by 
women, irrespective of their education. For instance, one woman stated that “[marriage 
in church] is the most beautiful day of your life ... you choose the most beautiful 
flowers … you choose the best restaurant … you choose the most beautiful dress… In 
short: for the most beautiful day of your life you want everything to be perfect!” (FG5, 
woman, low educated). 
Opting for a civil marriage clearly represents a secularized, public choice. When 
the partner is not a believer or belongs to another religion it is possible to celebrate a 
mixed rite. In the Canonic body of laws, a Church marriage is valid even if one of the 
partners is not Catholic. The main aspect differentiating religious and civil marriage is 
the quality and status of the ceremony. The religious ceremony is more pompous, but it 
also lends more importance to the day itself. A church is perceived as a “nicer 
location”. On the other hand, a civil ceremony is not perceived as attractive or exciting, 
as for the following woman: 
 
a civil ceremony is not very exciting … a Church marriage is another story: 
there is more pathos! I think those who marry in Church because they are 
religious themselves are very few, they simply do it because of tradition (FG1, 
woman, highly educated) 
 
The rituality of a Church wedding helps to preserve tradition. Also, for those who 
cohabit prior to marriage, such ritual is important. They start to live together without 
marrying in order to test the functionality of their relationship, but still plan marriage as 
the ultimate goal. For instance, one female informant declared: “I started to cohabit to 
test my relationship, but only with the idea of soon marrying in Church” (FG1, woman, 
highly educated). Interestingly, from this perspective marriage can be conceived more 
as a “rite of confirmation” than as a “rite of passage” (Saraceno 2012). 
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For several participants, the decision to cohabit, or even the decision to marry in 
the town council, means “breaking with tradition”. When a specific reference to the 
parents‟ desire for a Church wedding is made, generally the person‟s father is 
mentioned. Church weddings are preferred because “the real marriage is in church! For 
my father „a contract‟ at the municipality has no meaning” (FG2, woman, highly 
educated). Another female informant stated: “I think that many people are marrying in 
Church because they think that otherwise their father would be disappointed” (FG1, 
woman, highly educated). 
In the FG interviews a clear tendency among participants to associate “marriage” 
with a “church marriage” emerged. Interestingly, those who would like to reject 
marriage in order to oppose the prevailing morality, the group of „ideological 
cohabitors‟, do not find civil marriage a suitable alternative to religious marriage, 
because it also represents a choice imposed by society. They think that only cohabiting 
represents a public rejection of the “marriage system”. 
To summarize, our findings reveal the importance of religion in family formation 
choices. However, for the most part this influence seems to act indirectly, through the 
channels of social pressure and tradition, and not through an explicit attachment to 
precepts and dogmas. The focus group participants suggest that the choice of marriage 
may represent more a tribute to tradition, parents‟ wishes, and social expectations – 
which are strongly related to religiosity – rather than a conscious desire to adhere to 
religious precepts. 
 
 
5.4 Within-country idiosyncrasies 
Italy has marked regional differences in family formation practices (Kertzer et al. 
2008). Our analysis considers only Florence, in Central Italy: since the 1980s the city 
has traditionally been governed by liberal left-wing parties that are relatively supportive 
of non-traditional living arrangements. Our findings seem to be in line with this open-
minded attitude towards new family practices. However, almost all FG interviews 
included participants with Southern Italian origins, providing us the opportunity to elicit 
differences across regions. Our research corroborates previous qualitative and 
quantitative findings regarding the deep socio-demographic differences between Italian 
regions (Kertzer et al. 2008; Löffler 2009; Salvini and De Rose 2011), suggesting that 
the link between religion and family formation choices is mediated by the regional 
setting (see also Garelli 2011). The participants constantly referred to the South-North 
division, saying that the role of religion is more powerful in the southern regions of the 
country because the South is simply more religious and more attached to traditional 
values. Also, the pressure people feel from family and society to get married rather than 
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cohabit seems to be exacerbated in Southern Italy. However, exploring in greater detail 
how the regional context mediates opinions and attitudes towards marriage and 
cohabitation is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
 
6. Results: Legal framework and union formation choices 
A secondary objective of our investigation is to explore the link between family 
formation and the legal regulation of marriage and divorce, which has been extensively 
shaped by the Roman Catholic Church. Although the FG guidelines did not explicitly 
ask about fears of the cost of divorce, the topic appeared spontaneously in all groups. 
Divorce in Italy seems to incur economic and psychological costs, as well as taking 
time. Deciding to dissolve an unhappy marriage implies being ready to afford economic 
and psychological costs due to the many formalities and technicalities. In addition, if 
spouses disagree and/or have children, the time required to legally separate can be much 
longer. Statements such as the following were present in nearly all FG interviews, “…if 
you are married, divorce essentially means many psychological costs, many legal 
strains, especially if you have children…” (FG4, man, highly educated). As a 
consequence, at several points in the discussions the participants said that one of the 
major advantages of cohabitation over marriage is that cohabitating relationships are 
easier to terminate: “Cohabitation has an advantage in case of separation: if you cohabit 
everything is simpler because it does not incur many technicalities” (FG8, man, low 
educated), “Divorce is a complex, long, and expensive thing. So, although the couple is 
unhappy, you may be forced to remain together. By contrast, putting an end to a 
cohabiting union is much faster” (FG2, woman, highly educated). 
On the other hand, informants also acknowledged the legal disadvantages of 
cohabitation. Being unmarried was seen as “having almost no type of protection”. For 
instance, participants were aware that unmarried individuals are not entitled to draw 
benefits, such as the partner‟s old age pension, upon death. Many participants also 
mentioned that, if they died, their belongings, such as savings or property, would 
become the property of their family of origin and not of their partners. Further, 
additional voices worried about regulations in the event of illness. They especially 
feared situations in which one partner might be seriously ill: they feared not being 
recognized as a family member. 
In the Italian public and political debate these legal disadvantages of cohabitation 
are challenged by the increasing public demand to extend to cohabitation the rights and 
the obligations that are regulated within marriage. However, the question is, when non-
believing heterosexual partners have the possibility of formalizing their union through a 
civil marriage and could simply get married, why are they asking for additional rights 
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for cohabiting partners? This question emerged spontaneously from the interaction 
between participants in nearly all the meetings; for instance, 
 
If you ask for the legalization of consensual unions, why don’t you simply get 
married? It is not a matter of religion, because ‘civil marriage’ does exist, I 
mean: you can marry in the town council instead of the Church. (FG2, 
woman, highly educated) 
 
This question is also quite common in Italian political debate, because it is the 
major argument of those who are against extending partners‟ rights to cohabiting 
couples. Our qualitative investigation shed light on this hot topic. The replies were 
always the same and can be divided into two groups. The majority of people reacted by 
saying that they would prefer to cohabit instead of having a civil marriage because in 
the case of divorce, given the adverse Italian legal setting, they would likely experience 
many legal and economic problems. The second group consisted of a select group of 
highly educated informants, „ideological cohabitors‟ who openly opposed marriage as 
an institution, who argued that no matter if a marriage is celebrated with a religious or 
civil ceremony, it has a symbolic meaning that people should be free to reject. To the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first time that this topic has been clearly systematized 
with these two motivations distinctly emerging. 
Finally, in 6 out of 8 groups there was a spontaneous discussion regarding the legal 
rights of same-sex couples compared to heterosexual couples. Participants argued for 
the public recognition of same-sex couples, because they cannot be seen as “second 
class” citizens compared to heterosexual couples who belong to the “first class”. 
Heterosexual couples that would like to formally legalize their unions are entitled to get 
married, likely celebrating a civil ceremony if they are not true believers. However, 
homosexual couples have no choice but to cohabit without the possibility of legally 
regulating their rights as partners (e.g., inheritance, pension benefits, visitation rights). 
One male participant stated: “I think that some forms of protection [for cohabiting 
couples] are required, because otherwise one neglects a whole world of emotional 
relationships that concerns homosexual couples that are not entitled to marry” (FG3, 
man, high education). 
Overall, FG participants in Florence perceived a whole spectrum of legal 
disadvantages of cohabitation compared to marriage. In addition, the participants 
pointed out that although same-sex couples are today increasingly accepted, the State 
has failed to adjust to this on-going change. Whether the attitudes we revealed for the 
city of Florence are representative of other Italian realities is unknown. 
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7. Summary and discussion  
For much of Italy‟s history, the institutions of marriage and religion have been closely 
related (Ercolessi 2009). There is a general consensus among Italian demographers and 
sociologists that religious attendance and belief are positively associated with marriage. 
However, we know little about how religion prevents the diffusion of cohabitation, 
because it is still unclear in which dimensions religion and family choices intertwine the 
most. Investigating FG discussions illuminates some of the nuances of how people 
experience religion and draw upon it when making family choices. Our findings suggest 
that in Italy the Roman Catholic Church maintains a strong influence in shaping family 
formation patterns in favor of marriage. In this respect, at least three key findings 
emerge from our study. 
First, despite the principles of the Roman Catholic Church declaring marriage to 
be a sacrament and prescribing that sexual relations should only occur within a 
marriage and that artificial means of contraception are forbidden, no single reference to 
the fact that cohabitation means „living in sin‟ appeared in the discussions. Essentially, 
two select groups formed of highly educated individuals made explicit references to 
Catholicism: the group of „ideological cohabitors‟ and the group of „deep believers‟. 
For the former group, the choice to cohabit represents an important public rejection of 
the institution of marriage. For the latter, marriage has a symbolic meaning, and has a 
value that goes beyond a simple civil union. In general, our findings can be read as in 
line with those who talk about “religious bricolage” (Garelli, Guizzardi, and Pace 2003; 
Caltabiano, Dalla Zuanna, and Rosina 2006), referring to the majority of people who 
maintain a relation with the transcendent, form an independent sense of religiosity, and 
are flexible about accepting or refusing specific dogmas (see also Garelli 2011; 
Bonarini 2013). In sum, the influence of the Catholic Church permeates the setting of 
family choices in Italy, but our findings reveal the possibility that the perception of 
religion‟s importance in individual choices mainly acts indirectly, and not through an 
explicit attachment to precepts and dogmas. 
Instead, we found strong pressure in favor of marriage coming from the family of 
origin and society in general. The informants discussed the perception of social 
disapproval of cohabitation, including a lack of social recognition and possible 
stigmatization by “the others.” In addition, the family of origin perceives that their child 
is „really settled down‟ only if he/she is married. The pressure is not explicit and strong, 
but it is felt. This finding supports the argument of a link between strong family ties and 
the lack of development of cohabitation (Rosina and Fraboni 2004; Di Giulio and 
Rosina 2007; Schröder 2008). Since parents tend to discourage their offspring from 
non-normative behaviors (such as cohabitation), their adult children are confronted with 
strong pressure when making their own choices. In the diffusion of modern cohabitation 
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in Italy the influence of older generations is thus crucial (see also Belletti, Boffo, and 
Pennati 2007; Grilli 2010). Our findings suggest that the secularization process 
especially involves the younger generations, who will soon become parents and are less 
likely to pressure their own children to marry (Rosina and Fraboni 2004; Di Giulio and 
Rosina 2007). Thus, cohabitation will increasingly spread through Italian society 
according to a vertical diffusion of family behaviors.  
Third, the role of tradition seems to be central in people‟s family choices. The 
popular choice of a religious marriage reveals a strong persistence of attitudes and 
behaviors that are close to religious precepts (Caltabiano, Dalla Zuanna, and Rosina 
2006). However, in many cases this choice seems to represent more a form of ritual, an 
acknowledgment of tradition and habits, rather than representing a conscious 
consequence of specific religious choices. Many people opt for marriage because they 
would like to preserve age-old traditions rather than because they attach importance to 
Catholic precepts. 
An additional finding of this research is that the status of cohabitation is 
unanimously recognized as having strong legal disadvantages. Partners‟ rights are a 
serious problem. There might be problems with hospital visits and getting specific 
information on a partner‟s condition, especially if the partner is in a critical condition, 
as well as with inheritance. Therefore several participants considered marriage as more 
attractive than cohabitation specifically for this reason. The lack of legal recognition of 
cohabitors‟ rights is perceived as unfair and unjust, especially among those who do not 
recognize themselves in the „dominant thinking‟ of society and the Church. Thus, we 
provide qualitative evidence on the divergence that exists between the lack of state laws 
regarding consensual unions, and the acceptance of cohabitation on an individual basis.  
Another specific feature of Italian society is embedded in the relatively complex 
legal procedure that is required to obtain a divorce. Our analysis has shown that this 
complicated procedure, originally intended to discourage marriage dissolution, seems to 
have resulted in the opposite effect. One reason young adults opt for cohabitation is to 
avoid the difficulties of terminating an unhappy marriage. Many participants expressed 
a desire for the law to be modified to make divorce easier and quicker, recognizing the 
ongoing new Italian family dynamics. Thus, a simplification of the present law might, 
ironically, encourage entry into marriage. The role of divorce legislation as an inhibitor 
of marriage needs to be further explored in the future (qualitative and quantitative) 
research. Currently, a new law proposing a “short divorce” is being under discussion in 
the Italian Parliament; it has been approved by the Low Chamber and will be discussed 
in the Senate in Autumn 2014. 
To conclude, it is important to note that the attitudes we found for the city of 
Florence may not be generalizable to other Italian realities. Previous qualitative 
research (Schröder 2008; Löffler 2009) focusing on Bologna (Emilia-Romagna region) 
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and Cagliari (Sardinia region) revealed at least two different settings for family 
formation practices. The Centre-North (exemplified by the city of Bologna) is 
characterized by less traditional attitudes towards new union formation practices, while 
the South and Islands (represented by the city of Cagliari) are much more traditional. 
The population living in the city of Florence – and Tuscany, in general – is quite 
secular, and this can affect informants‟ answers. However, our findings are in line with 
the view expressed by other scholars regarding the relatively flexible attitudes of 
Italians towards sexuality and contraception with respect to Catholic doctrine (Dalla 
Zuanna, De Rose, and Racioppi 2005; Caltabiano, Dalla Zuanna, and Rosina 2006; 
Barbagli, Dalla Zuanna, and Garelli 2010). We showed that the widely prevailing 
pressure of parents and peers and the hedonistic aspects of the traditional Church 
wedding are much more important in partnership formation and way of living as a 
couple than Catholic prescripts. Thus, we posit that the direct effect of religion on 
individual choices is overestimated when interpreting the Italian family. 
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